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Abstract
Motivated by posted price auctions where buyers are grouped in an unknown number of latent
types characterized by their private values for the good on sale, we investigate regret minimization
in stochastic dynamic pricing when the distribution of buyers’ private values is supported on an
unknown set of points in [0, 1] of unknown cardinality K.
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1. Introduction
In the online posted price auction problem, also known as dynamic pricing, an unlimited supply of
identical goods is sold to a sequence of buyers. To each buyer in the sequence, the seller makes
a take-it-or-leave-it offer for the good at a certain price (which we assume to belong to the unit
interval [0, 1]). The good is purchased if and only if the offered price is lower or equal to the buyer’s
private valuation (also assumed to be in [0, 1]). At the end of the transaction, the seller’s revenue
is either zero (if the good is not sold) or equal to the offered price. The buyer’s valuation is never
observed. Indeed, the seller only learns a single bit for each auction, i.e., whether the good was
sold or not at the chosen price. Similarly to previous works (Kleinberg and Leighton, 2003; Blum
et al., 2004; Blum and Hartline, 2005), we assume that the price offered to the t-th buyer in the
sequence only depends on the past history of observed sales. In particular, we assume that buyers
are indistinguishable, and provide no information to the seller other than their willingness to buy at
the specified price. For this reason, the seller can post the price for the next buyer publicly, before
the buyer shows up.
We evaluate the seller’s performance in terms of regret, measuring the difference between the
seller’s revenue and the revenue achievable by consistently posting the optimal price. The regret
in dynamic pricing was initially investigated by Kleinberg and Leighton (2003) under various as-
sumptions on the generation of the buyers’ valuations. In the stochastic setting, in which valuations
are drawn i.i.d. from a fixed and unknown distribution on [0, 1], they show that no algorithm can
achieve a o(
√
T ) regret and provide an algorithm achieving regret of order C
√
T log T , where T is
the number of buyers in the sequence and C only depends on the distribution of buyers’ valuations.
Their upper-bound holds under some assumptions on the demand curve, which is the function D
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mapping each price x to the probability D(x) = P(V ≥ x) that the good is sold. Specifically, the
revenue function x 7→ xD(x) is required to have a unique global maximum x? ∈ (0, 1) and be twice
differentiable with a negative second derivative at x?. Without these assumptions, the authors prove
a much higher lower bound of order T 2/3 on the regret. The algorithm achieving the C
√
T log T
regret under the above assumptions on the demand curve is simple: it runs the UCB1 policy for
stochastic bandits (Auer et al., 2002a) on a discretized set of K = (T/ log T )1/4 prices.
In this paper, we study the stochastic setting of dynamic pricing under completely different
assumptions on the demand curve. Namely, that the distribution of buyers’ valuations is supported
on an unknown set of unknown finite cardinality K. This models any setting in which buyers
are grouped in an unknown number of latent types, characterized by their private values for the
good on sale. In particular, this applies to regret minimization in sellers’ repeated second-price
auctions with a single relevant buyer. This scenario emerges naturally when a seller and a buyer
interact repeatedly, and the valuation of the good depends on contextual information known only
to the buyer. For instance, in online advertising each time a user lands on a publisher’s website,
an impression is put on sale to a set of relevant advertisers through an auction (note that whenever
there is a single relevant advertiser for the impression, second-price auctions with reserve price are
equivalent to posted price auctions). Now, typically, the advertiser’s valuation for the impression
depends on which segment the user belongs to, where the finite segmentation is based on private
information not accessible to the publisher.
Note that our model is very different from assuming that the seller is restricted to offer prices
from a known finite set of size K (Rothschild, 1974), which makes dynamic pricing a special case
of K-armed stochastic bandits. In our model, the seller does not know the K buyers’ valuations,
not even their number! So, besides learning which valuation has the highest revenue, the seller must
also learn the location of these values. This interplay between noisy search and bandit allocation is
one of the main themes of our work.
In contrast with previous approaches, which typically assume parametric (Broder and Rus-
mevichientong, 2012) or locally smooth (Kleinberg and Leighton, 2003) demand curves, our model
with finitely many valuations is equivalent to assuming that the demand curve is piecewise constant
with a finite number of discontinuities. Recently, den Boer and Keskin (2018) designed an algo-
rithm for piecewise continuous demand curves achieving an upper bound of orderC
√
T log T in the
piecewise constant case. However, up to constant factors, their hefty leading constant C is at least
as big as the maximum between K22γ−16c−2 and K12γ−8c−18, where c is the minimum distance
between valuations and both K and the smallest drop γ in the demand curve must be known in
advance. Although their setting extends ours to certain piecewise parametric demand curves, we
believe that discontinuities are the real source of additional hardness of this dynamic pricing model
with respect to previously studied settings.
Our first result is a lower bound of order
√
KT on the regret in the distribution-free case (where
the regret is maximized over all possible demand curves), which holds even when the seller knows
the number and position of buyers’ private values in advance. This essentially establishes that our
setting is at least as hard as a K-armed bandit problem. Although we build on the stochastic lower
bound of Kleinberg and Leighton (2003), our proof is not a simple adaptation of theirs. Indeed, we
show that their proof breaks down when K is constant and T grows, which is exactly the regime
we are interested in. Then, we present an efficient algorithm achieving a distribution-free upper
bound on the regret of order
√
KT log T without any additional knowledge of the parameters of the
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problem.1 The detailed version of our bound has a significantly better dependence than den Boer
and Keskin (2018) on the smallest difference c between two adjacent valuations, and matches—up
to logarithmic factors—the lower bound stated above.
In the distribution-dependent case, when the gap ∆ between the revenue of the optimal valua-
tion and that of the second-best valuation is constant, we prove the impossibility of obtaining regret
bounds of order significantly better than
√
T even when K = 3, thus showing that this setting is
strictly harder than K-armed stochastic bandits. Motivated by this impossibility result, we investi-
gate distribution-dependent bounds that rely on additional information about the demand curve. By
combining suitable generalizations of UCB1 (Auer et al., 2002a) and the “cautious search” strategy
of Kleinberg and Leighton (2003), we obtain an efficient algorithm achieving a regret of order at
most
(
1/∆ + (log log T )/γ2
)(
K log T
)
, where, as before, γ is the smallest drop in the demand
curve. Since (K/∆) log T is the regret of K-armed stochastic bandits, this shows that the price of
identifying each one of the K valuations is at most (log T )(log log T )/γ2, which corresponds (up
to log log factors) to the known upper bounds for noisy binary search (Karp and Kleinberg, 2007).
We conclude the study of the distribution-dependent case by presenting an efficient algorithm with
regret of order (1/∆ + log log T ) log T when the number of valuations is known to be at most two.
Surprisingly, this bound is the same (up to log log terms) as the best possible bound for two-armed
stochastic bandits, achievable when not only the number, but also the locations of the valuations are
known in advance. In order to prove this result we introduce a novel technique for estimating (up
to a multiplicative constant) the expectation µ of any [0, 1]-valued random variable with probability
at least 1− δ, using at most O( 1µ ln 1δ ) samples, even if the expectation µ is not known in advance.
We believe this technique may be valuable in its own right.
2. Further related works
The literature on dynamic pricing and online posted price auctions is vast. We address the reader
to the excellent survey published by den Boer (2015), providing a comprehensive picture of the
state of the art until the end of 2014 —see also the tutorial slides by Slivkins and Zeevi (2015)
for a perspective more focused on computer science approaches. An important line of work in
dynamic pricing considers a nonstochastic setting in which the sequence of the buyers’ private
values is deterministic and unknown, and the seller competes against the best fixed price. This model
was pioneered by Kleinberg and Leighton (2003), who proved a O(T 2/3) upper bound (ignoring
logarithmic factors) on the aforementioned notion of regret. Later works (Blum et al., 2004; Blum
and Hartline, 2005) show simultaneous multiplicative and additive bounds on the regret when prices
have range [1, h]. These bounds have the form εG?T+O
(
(h lnh)/ε2
)
ignoring ln lnh factors, where
G?T is the total revenue of the optimal price p
?. Recent improvements on these results are due to
Bubeck et al. (2017), who prove that the additive term can be madeO(p?(lnh)/ε2), where the linear
scaling is now with respect to the optimal price rather than the maximum price h. Other variants
consider settings in which the number of copies of the item to sell is limited (Agrawal and Devanur,
2014; Babaioff et al., 2015; Badanidiyuru et al., 2013) or settings in which a returning buyer acts
strategically in order to maximize his utility in future rounds (Amin et al., 2013; Devanur et al.,
2014)
1. Throughout this paper we assume that the time horizon T is known by the seller in advance. This assumption can
be easily removed with a “doubling trick” (see, e.g., (Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi, 2006)), a standard technique for
extending regret bounds to time sequences of unknown length.
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Finally, although in this work we focus on the seller’s side, regret minimization approaches have
been recently applied also on the buyer’s side, for example in (McAfee, 2011; Weed et al., 2016).
3. Preliminaries and definitions
We assume all valuations Vt belong to a fixed and unknown finite set V = {v1, . . . , vK} ⊂ [0, 1],
with 0 = v0 ≤ v1 < · · · < vK ≤ vK+1 = 1. Unless otherwise specified, the sequence V1, V2, . . .
is assumed to be sampled i.i.d. from a fixed and unknown distribution on {v1, . . . , vK}. Let pi =
P(V1 = vi) and assume (without loss of generality) that pi > 0 for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,K}. An instance
of the posted price problem is then fully specified by the pairs (v1, p1), . . . , (vK , pK). We assume
auctions are implemented according to the following online protocol: for each round t ∈ {1, 2, . . . }
1. the seller posts a price Xt ∈ [0, 1]
2. buyer’s valuation Vt, hidden from the seller, is drawn from V according to {p1, . . . , pK}
3. the seller observes I {Vt ≥ Xt} ∈ {0, 1} and computes the revenue rt(Xt) = Xt I {Vt ≥ Xt}
Note that the expected revenue E[rt(x)] = E
[
x I {Vt ≥ x}
]
is equal to xD(x), where
D(x) = P(V1 ≥ x) =
∑
k : vk≥x
pk (1)
is the demand curve. Hence the price maximizing the expected revenue E[rt(x)] belongs to the set
of valuations {v1, . . . , vK} and we denote one of the possible optimal valuations by v? = vi? . We
define the suboptimality gap of vj with respect to v? by ∆j = E
[
r1(v
?)− r1(vj)
]
. The goal of the
seller is to minimize the regret
RT = max
x∈[0,1]
E
[
T∑
t=1
rt(x)−
T∑
t=1
rt(Xt)
]
= E
[
T∑
t=1
rt(v
?)− rt(Xt)
]
where the expectation is understood with respect to any randomness in the generation of V1, . . . , VT
and X1, . . . , XT . Formally, a deterministic seller is a sequence of functions X1, X2, . . . where
Xt = ft(X1, Z1, . . . , Xt−1, Zt−1) is the price posted at time t, the random variable Zs is the binary
feedback I {Vs ≥ Xs} received by the seller in at time s, and ft :
(
[0, 1]× {0, 1})t−1 → [0, 1] is an
arbitrary function. A randomized seller is a probability distribution over deterministic sellers.
4. Lower bounds
In this section we discuss some important similarities and differences between dynamic pricing with
K valuations and the K-armed bandit problem (proofs are deferred to Appendix A). First, we state
that in the distribution-free case the former is at least as difficult as the latter. More precisely, if
T ≥ K3, no algorithm can have regret better than√KT on dynamic pricing with K valuations.
Theorem 1 For any number of valuations K ≥ 3 and all time horizons T ≥ K3 there exist K
pairs (v1, p1), . . . , (vK , pK) such that the expected regret of any pricing strategy satisfies RT =
Ω
(√
KT
)
.
Next, we claim that in the distribution-dependent case, dynamic pricing is strictly harder than mul-
tiarmed bandits. More precisely, even if the suboptimality gap ∆ is constant and K is small, no
dynamic pricing algorithm can have regret better than
√
T , whereas the distribution-dependent re-
gret of multiarmed bandits is O(log T ).
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Algorithm 1:
Input: T ∈ N, δ ∈ (0, 1).
Initialization: K1 ← {1}, k1 ← 1, a1 ← 0, b1 ← 1, a0 ← 0, D(0)← 0.
1 for m = 1, 2, . . . do // search phase
2 if {j ∈ Km | bj − aj > T−1/2} 6= ∅ then
3 pick im = min{j ∈ Km | bj − aj > T−1/2};
4 offer price xm = (aim + bim)/2 for
⌈
8
√
T/km ln δ
−1⌉ rounds;
5 if D(aim)−D(xm) < (km/T )1/4/2 then // undershooting
6 if D(xm)−D(bim) ≥ (km/T )1/4/2 then // check for fake arms
7 update aim ← xm, Km+1 ← Km and km+1 ← km;
8 else update Km+1 ← Km \ {im} and km+1 ← km;
9 else if D(aim)−D(xm) ≥ (km/T )1/4/2 then // overshooting
10 if sign(ai − xm)
(
D(ai)−D(xm)
) ≥ (km/T )1/4/2 for all i then // new arms
11 set akm+1 ← xm, bkm+1 ← bim , Km+1 ← Km ∪ {km + 1} and km+1 ← km + 1;
12 update bim ← xm, Km+1 ← Km and km+1 ← km;
13 else denote the last macrostep by M and break;
14 end
15 run the UCB1 algorithm on the set of prices {aj}j∈KM ; // bandit phase
Theorem 2 If for some constant c? > 0 a seller algorithm has regret smaller than c?
√
T on any
instance of the stochastic dynamic pricing problem with at most three valuations, then there exists
an instance with ∆ = Θ(1) on which the algorithm suffers regret Ω(
√
T ).
This lower bound shows that
√
T is best possible in the distribution-dependent case even when K
is small and ∆ is a constant. In Section 6 we show how regret bounds can be substantially better
than
√
T when the learner knows the value of the smallest drop in the demand curve.
5. Distribution-free bounds
In this section we focus on distribution-free bounds, i.e., bounds that do not depend on the demand
curve. The regret bound we prove exceeds the theoretical lower bound stated in Section 4 by a
constant term depending only on the distance between adjacent valuations.
Our Algorithm 1 works in two phases: a search phase and a bandit phase. In the search phase a
binary search for all “relevant” valuations is performed. By the end of this phase, a tight estimate of
all such valuations is determined with high probability. During the bandit phase a stochastic bandit
algorithm is run on the estimated valuations. As it turns out, this simple scheme is enough to ensure
an optimal
√
KT convergence up to an additive constant independent of the distribution of buyer’s
valuations. Notably, the algorithm does not need to know K in advance. We call macrostep a block
of consecutive rounds in which the same price is offered consistently. For each price x we denote by
D(x) the fraction of accepted offers of x during the last macrostep in which x was offered. At the
beginning of the search phase, our algorithm receives as input the time horizon T and a confidence
parameter δ. The algorithm then proceeds in macrosteps of length
⌈
8
√
T/km ln δ
−1⌉, where km is
the total number of valuations discovered so far. The goal of the search phase is to approximately
locate all relevant valuations, that is valuations vi whose associated probability pi is at least 4
√
K/T .
5
DYNAMIC PRICING WITH FINITELY MANY UNKNOWN VALUATIONS
Initially, all relevant valuations belong to [a1, b1] = [0, 1]. The search proceeds as long as
there is at least an interval i containing relevant valuations with length larger than T−1/2 (line 2).
When such an interval i is selected at line 3, a macrostep of binary search is performed and the
midpoint price xm of [ai, bi] is offered for
⌈
8
√
T/km ln δ
−1⌉ rounds (line 4), thus obtaining an
estimate of its demand. If the difference in demands (line 5) is smaller than (km/T )−1/4/2 no
new relevant valuation is detected. Before eliminating the lower half of the interval (line 7), a
test designed to detect and remove fake arms is performed (line 6). We call fake arm an interval
containing no relevant valuations. Fake arms might be inadvertently allocated when intervals are
too wide. In that case, the comparison between two distant points may reveal a large difference
in demands due to the presence of several nonrelevant valuations in between. If that happens,
the fake arm is removed when the interval becomes small enough (line 8). When no significant
difference is detected between the demands, all relevant valuations in [ai, bi] remain in [xm, bi] with
high probability after the update. If, on the other hand, a difference between demands is detected
(line 9), two things happen. First, a test is performed to detect possible new relevant valuations
(line 10). If a new relevant valuation is spotted, a new interval [xm, bi] is allocated. Second, the
upper half of the interval [ai, bi] is removed. If [ai, bi] is split into [ai, xm] and [xm, bi], all relevant
valuations are split between the two intervals. If [ai, bi] is simply updated as [ai, xm]—since no
significant difference was detected between the demands at xm and bi—all relevant valuations in
[ai, bi] remain in [ai, xm] with high probability.
When all intervals become smaller than T−1/2 (line 13), the search phase ends and all intervals
[ai, bi] are returned. At this point each relevant valuation is contained in one of the intervals with
high probability. Therefore the algorithm has now access to T−1/2-close approximations of all of
them, and the bandit phase begins. In the bandit phase, the algorithm UCB1 (Auer et al., 2002a) is
run on the set of left endpoints of the intervals (line 15).
Theorem 3 If Algorithm 1 is run on an unknown number K of pairs (v1, p1), . . . , (vK , pK) with
input parameter δ = T−2, then its regret satisfies RT = O˜
(√
KT
)
+ V (V + 1) where V =
maxi∈{1,...,K} v4k(vi − vi−1)−5.
We actually prove a slightly improved bound, in which the constant V (V + 1) is replaced by the
smaller term K(v4K/v
4
1)
(
1 + (v4K/c
4)
)
, where c = mini∈{2,...,K}{vi − vi−1}. To give a frame of
reference, previously known upper bounds for discontinuous demand curves (den Boer and Keskin,
2018) are at best of order
(
K20/c18
)√
T , where v1 is assumed to be bounded away from zero and
K needs to be known in advance.
Proof sketch The probability the event B of making at least one mistake in at least one test of the
form(
D(x)−D(y) < 4
√
km
16T ∧ D(x)−D(y) ≥ 4
√
km
T
)
or
(
D(x)−D(y) ≥ 4
√
km
16T ∧ D(x) = D(y)
)
is at most O(√K3/T ) by Hoeffding’s inequality. Assume now that the complement B of B holds.
Then, at most K binary searches are performed and—up to log factors—the regret increases by at
most
∑K
k=1
√
T/k ≤ √T ∫K0 x−1/2dx = 2√KT. The additive term comes from the two follow-
ing facts: if vK is optimal and vK /∈
⋃
i∈KM [ai, bi], then it has to have a higher revenue than v1,
which in turn gives T < K(vK/v1)4; if any other vj is optimal and vj /∈
⋃
i∈KM [ai, bi], then it has
to be better than vj+1 and v1, which in turn gives T < Kv8K/(v1c)
4. Finally, running UCB1 on at
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mostK valuations which are T−1/2-close approximations of {v1, . . . , vK} increments the regret by
at most O˜(√KT ).
6. Distribution-dependent bounds
In this section we focus on distribution-dependent bounds, i.e., bounds that are parameterized in
terms of the demand curve. The algorithm we design ignores the exact number of valuations, but
it is given a lower bound γ on the smallest probability pmin (i.e., the smallest drop in the demand).
This gives an upper bound on the number of valuations, since γ ≤ pmin implies K ≤ 1/γ. The
regret bound we prove exceeds the distribution-dependent regret (K log T )/∆ of standard stochas-
tic bandits by a term of order K(log T )(log log T )/γ2. Note that if the number K of valuations
(counting only those which are at least T−1 apart) is exactly known, it is easy to prove an excess
regret bound of order K
(
(log T )/pmin
)2 even when pmin (or a lower bound on it) is unknown. To
see this, consider and algorithm that performs O(log T ) binary search steps for each one of the K
valuations, repeating each step O((log T )/γ2) times and using a value of γ that decreases geomet-
rically until all K valuations are found. A similar argument gives the same regret bound if K is not
known exactly, but γ ≤ pmin and c ≤ mink(pk − pk−1) are both known.
We define a seller algorithm (Algorithm 2) in which a UCB-like strategy detects promising
sub-intervals of [0, 1]. These sub-intervals are then explored with an extension (to an unknown
number of unknown valuations) of the “cautious search” for a single unknown valuation introduced
by Kleinberg and Leighton (2003).
The main intuition is very simple: in order to estimate D(x) we divide time in blocks (called
again macrosteps) of equal length, and build an estimate D(x) by consistently posting the same
price x within each block. In order to decide which arm i to use in each macrostep, we compute
an upper confidence bound Ui on the average demand in the i-th interval, and then select the arm
attaining the highest of such bounds. Algorithm 2 receives as input the time horizon T , a lower
bound γ on pmin = mini pi, and a confidence parameter δ. Given these parameters, the number of
macrosteps is defined as the biggest Mγ ∈ N satisfying T ≥ Mγd8 ln(δ−1)/γ2e. The fraction of
accepted offers of price x during the m-th macrostep (in which x is offered) is denoted by Dm(x).
In line 3, the selected arm im is the one maximizing, over intervals [ai, bi], the product biUi. The
quantity Ui is the upper confidence bound
Ui = D̂m(i) +
1
bi
√
ln(δ−1)
Nm(i)
where Nm(i) is
⌈
8γ−2 ln δ−1
⌉
(if i > 1, which takes into account the macrostep in which interval
i was allocated) plus the total number of times that i was picked in the first m − 1 macrosteps,
ignoring the steps occurring in all macrosteps when line 13 was executed. D̂m(i) is the fraction of
accepted offers during these Nm(i) steps.
The algorithm initially looks for valuation v1, and then allocates searches for new valuations
incrementally. Whenever a new value of the demand curve is observed, providing evidence for
the existence of a i-th previously unseen valuation, an interval [ai, bi] (which we associate with a
bandit arm) and a step size εi are allocated. The interval [ai, bi] estimates the smallest valuation
vi contained in it. By construction of the algorithm, vi is never removed from [ai, bi] (with high
7
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Algorithm 2:
Input: Time horizon T ∈ N, confidence parameter δ ∈ (0, 1).
Initialization: set κ0 = 1, a1 ← 0, b1 ← 1, n1 ← 1, ε1 ← 1/2, D(a1) = 1.
1 for m = 1 toMγ do
2 set κm ← κm−1;
3 compute im ← arg maxi≤κm biUi; // greedy pick
4 if bim − aim ≤ 1/T then post aim ; // if [aim , bim ] is tiny, keep playing aim
5 else
6 post Xm = aim + nimεim for
⌈
8 ln(δ−1)/γ2
⌉
rounds and compute D(Xm);
7 if D(aim)−D(Xm) < γ/2 then // no new valuations spotted
8 if Xm + εim < bim then update nim ← nim + 1;
9 else update aim ← Xm, nim ← 0, εim ← ε2im ; // shrink [aim , bim ]
10 else (denoting a0 = D(0) = 0)
11 if ∀i 6= im, sign(ai −Xm)
(
D(ai)−D(Xm)
) ≥ γ/2 then // new valuation
12 set κm ← κm−1 + 1, aκm ← Xm, bκm ← bim , nκm ← 1, εκm ← εim ;
13 update aim ← Xm − εim , bim ← Xm, nim ← 0, εim ← ε2im ; // shrink [aim , bim ]
14 end
probability) when the interval shrinks. This implies that the more [ai, bi] shrinks, the closer the
upper bound biUi gets to the true revenue viD(vi).
Cautious searches are performed within each interval. At the beginning, all valuations belong
to [a1, b1] = [0, 1]. Whenever an interval is selected (line 3), a macrostep of cautious search is
performed (lines 4-13). During a cautious search in [ai, bi] with step size εi, the sequence of values
Xm = ai + kεi for k ∈ {1, 2, . . . } is posted
⌈
8γ−2 ln δ−1
⌉
times each, until a change is spotted in
the demand or Xm gets within εi of bi. We spot a change in the demand curve when the difference
at line 7 becomes bigger than γ/2. If Xm gets within εi of bi before a change in the demand is
discovered, the interval shrinks to [Xm, bim ] and the step size is refined (line 9). Note that the
shrunken interval contains (with high probability) all valuations that were in [ai, bi] because no
change in the demand was spotted. If, on the other hand, there is evidence of a change in the
demand, then the interval shrinks to [Xm−εi, Xm] and the step size is reduced (line 13). If at line 11
the newly discovered value of the demand differs from all previously detected demand values by
at least γ/2, then a new interval [Xt, bi] is allocated (line 12). Otherwise, the new demand value
matches (with high probability) the value of D(bi) and the shrunken interval contains all valuations
that were in [ai, bi]. This process continues until the length of the feasible interval [aj , bj ] of the
arm j with the highest bjUj is less than 1/T . Afterwards, the seller offers the same price aj each
time that j is selected (line 4).
As time goes by, the number κ of discovered valuations grows until possibly reaching the actual
number of valuations K. Simultaneously, each estimate biUi converges to the revenue of the small-
est valuation in the interval. After enough macrosteps, picking the interval i with the highest biUi
becomes equivalent to choosing a 1/T -approximation of an optimal valuation.
Without loss of generality, in the analysis of the algorithm we assume all valuations v1, . . . , vK
are at least 1/T apart. Let im be the index of the arm chosen at macrostep m (line 3). For any
k = {1, . . . ,K}, we denoteMk =
{
m ≤Mγ | vk ∈ [aim , bim ]
}
.
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Theorem 4 If Algorithm 2 is run on an unknown number K of pairs (v1, p1) . . . , (vK , pK) with
input parameters γ ≤ mink pk and δ = T−2, then its regret satisfies
RT ≤
∑
i : ∆i>0
4 lnT
∆i
+O
(
K log T
γ2
log log T
)
.
To put things into perspective, previously known upper bounds for discontinuous demand curves
(den Boer and Keskin, 2018) need at least the additional knowledge of K and are at best of order(
K24/γ16
)√
T .
Proof sketch Without loss of generality, assume MγBγ = T where Bγ ≥ 8 ln(δ−1)/γ2 is the
length of a macrostep. The probability of the event B of making at least one mistake in at least one
test(∣∣Dm(x)−Dm(y)∣∣ < γ2 ∧ |D(x)−D(y)| ≥ γ) or (|Dm(x)−Dm(y)| > γ2 ∧ D(x) = D(y))
(2)
is at most 4(K + 1)Mγδ by Hoeffding’s inequality. Assume now that the complement B of B
holds and denote by vµ(i) the smallest valuation in [ai, bi]. Since pµ(i) ≥ γ by hypothesis, event
Xm > vµ(i) implies that the test in line 7 is false, and therefore line 13 is executed. This implies the
following Lemma, that we prove before moving forward with the analysis of Algorithm 2.
Lemma 5 Pick k ∈ {1, . . . ,K} and n ∈ {1, . . . , |Mk|}. Let [0, 1] ≡ I1 ⊇ · · · ⊇ In ≡ [a′n, b′n] be
the sequence of the first n intervals computed by n steps of a cautious search (see Appendix B) for
the single valuation vk with initial interval [0, 1]. If B holds, then a′n ≤ aim and b′n = bim , where
m is the n-th smallest value inMk. Moreover, the price Xm offered by Algorithm 2 at macrostep
m is equal to the n-th price offered by the cautious search for the single valuation vk.
Proof of Lemma 5 Fix a valuation vk. Let A be Algorithm 2 and C be the cautious search for
vk. The proof is by induction on n. Since A and C both start with interval [0, 1] and price 1/2
the statement holds for n = 1. Now let m be the (n + 1)-st smallest value in Tk and let s be the
largest value in Tk that is smaller than m. Let In ≡ [a′n, b′n] be the n-th interval computed by C.
By induction, a′n ≤ ais , b′n = bis , and Xs is offered by both A and C. The only interesting case to
discuss is when the test at line 7 is false. There are two subcases: if the test at line 11 is false, then
it must be Xs > vk. In this case C overshoots and the interval is updated exactly in the same way
by C and A (see line 13). If the test at line 11 is true, then it must be vi < Xs ≤ vk. This is not
an overshoot for C, so In+1 ≡ In. A, however, creates a new interval [a, b] —containing vk— with
a = Xs, b = bis , and unchanged step size εis . The next time m this new interval is selected, the
price Xm offered by A is the same as the price offered by C because the step size did not change.
We now continue with the proof of Theorem 4. Let nm(i) be the number of macrosteps (in the
first m − 1 macrosteps) where i was picked. Similarly, let OSm(i) be the number of macrosteps
(in the first m − 1 macrosteps) when i was picked and Xm > vµ(i). Then we have Nm(i) =
Bγ
(
nm(i)−OSm(i)
)
. Now note that D̂m(i) is the sample mean of a Bernoulli of parameterD(vµ(i))
because it is computed overNm(i) points sampled between ai and vµ(i). Fix a suboptimal valuation
vk and a macrostep m such that µ(im) = k. Let i? be such that v? ∈
[
ai? , bi?
]
. Then, im 6= i?
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implies
bi?Ui? ≤ bimUim ⇐⇒
(
bi?D̂m(i
?) +
√
ln(δ−1)
Nm(i?)
)
≤
(
bimD̂m(im) +
√
ln(δ−1)
Nm(im)
)
=⇒
(
v?D̂m(i
?) +
√
ln(δ−1)
Nm(i?)
)
≤
(
vkD̂m(im) +
2Bγ
Nm(im)
+
√
ln(δ−1)
Nm(im)
)
where in the last implication we used Lemma 9 in Appendix B and nm(im) ≥ Nm(im)/Bγ . Ob-
serve that E
[
D̂m(i
?)
]
= D
(
vµ(i?)
) ≥ D(v?) and E[D̂m(im)] = D(vk). Moreover, the two
quantities
√(
ln(δ−1)
)/(
Nm(i?)
)
and 2Bγ/Nm(im) +
√(
ln(δ−1)
)/(
Nm(im)
)
play the role of
upper confidence bounds for the estimates v?D̂m(i?) and vkD̂m(im).
Therefore, we can apply a modification of the analysis of UCB1 (Auer et al., 2002a, Proof of
Theorem 1) to K arms with reward expectations vkD(vk) for k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}, and such that the
upper confidence bound for any suboptimal arm k is inflated by 2Bγ/Nm(im). (In fact Lemma 10
is stronger than what we need, because v? always belongs to some interval [aj? , bj? ] but not all sub-
optimal valuations vk are the smallest valuation of the interval [ajk , bjk ] they belong to.) Recalling
that Bγ ≥ 8
(
ln(δ−1)
)
/γ2, Lemma 10 with α = 16 gives
Bγ E
I{B} ∑
m : µ(im)=k
I {im 6= i?}
 ≤ 1 + ((δT )2 + 64
γ2
)
2K ln(δ−1) +
∑
k : ∆k>0
4 ln(δ−1)
∆k
where ∆k = v?D(i?)−vkD(vk) > 0.2 The fact that we prevent the algorithm from switching arms
within each macrostep is not an issue. Indeed, the proof of the lemma works irrespective of whether
the decision of pulling a different arm is made at every macrostep as opposed to every step. In
particular, the proof establishes that after each suboptimal arm is selected order of (lnT )/γ2 times,
corresponding to a constant number of macrosteps, the probability of pulling any suboptimal arm
ever again becomes tiny, of order T−2.
Applying Lemma 5 and Lemma 8 to the macrosteps of Algorithm 2, we obtain∑
m∈Mk
(
rt(vk)− rt(Xt)
) ≤ (3 ln ln |Mk|)+ 8 . (3)
2. The factor I
{B} inside the expectation is needed to reduce the problem to an instance of a standard stochastic bandit.
It can be conveniently dropped in the analysis of Lemma 10.
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Therefore, with probability at least 1 − 4(K + 1)Mγδ, the regret over the T steps (recall that we
repeatedly post the same price in each step of a macrostep) is bounded by
BγE
 Mγ∑
m=1
(
v?D(v?)−XmD(Xm)
)
≤ BγE
 K∑
k=1
∑
m :µ(im)=k
(
v?D(v?)− vkD(vk)
)
+
K∑
k=1
∑
m∈Mk
(
vkD(vk)−XmD(Xm)
)
≤ Bγ
K∑
k=1
∆kE
I{B} ∑
m :µ(im)=k
I {im 6= i?}
+ TP(B) +Bγ K∑
k=1
(
3 ln ln |Mk|+ 8
)
(using (3))
≤ 1 +
(
(δT )2 +
64
γ2
)
2K ln(δ−1) +
∑
k : ∆k>0
4 ln(δ−1)
∆k
+ TP(B) +BγK
(
3 ln lnT + 8
)
.
Finally, in order to bound TP(B) ≤ 4(K+ 1)TMγδ = (K+ 1)(Tγ)2δ/(2 ln δ−1), set δ = T−2.
We conclude this section by discussing the case of at most two valuations. We design an algorithm
with regret of order log(T )/∆ + log(T ) log log(T ), which is (up to the log log term) as if the exact
values of v1 and v2 were known in advance! This is achieved by leveraging some properties of
the smallest and the biggest valuation. For example, any offer of a price lower or equal to v1 is
deterministically accepted and all offers above v2 are always rejected. If on the other hand a price
x ∈ (v1, v2] is offered, the probability that that price is accepted is exactly p2, which is enough
to reconstruct the entire distribution (p1, p2) on {v1, v2}. Furthermore, the suboptimality gap ∆ is
always equal to |v1 − p2v2|.
Other than the result itself, we believe the techniques used in designing and analyzing the al-
gorithm could be of interest on their own. Theorem 13 in particular gives a way to compute a
high-probability multiplicative estimate of the unknown expectation µ > 0 of any [0, 1]-valued
random variable using only O( 1µ) samples. We now state the result. All the details about the algo-
rithm and its subroutines, their pseudocodes, and the remaining theoretical results are presented in
Appendix D.
Theorem 6 If Algorithm 7 (see Appendix D) is run with input parameter δ = T−2 on an unknown
instance (v1, p1) and (v2, p2), then its regret satisfies RT = O
(
log(T )/∆ + (log T )(log log T )
)
,
where the first term is zero when ∆ = |p2v2 − v1| is zero.
7. Open problems
Our work leaves some interesting questions open. Can we prove a distribution-free upper bound
of order
√
KT that does not depend on the locations of buyers’ valuations? Can we prove a
distribution-dependent upper bound without any prior knowledge at all for K larger than two? Can
we obtain a
√
KT regret bound in the nonstochastic setting when K ≥ 2 and all valuations are
unknown?
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Appendix A. Lower Bounds
In this section we prove the lower bounds (Theorems 1 and 2) stated in Section 4. Kleinberg and
Leighton (2003) showed that RT = Ω(T 2/3) if T ≤ K3 by building a distribution over a set of
ε-spaced valuations v1, . . . , vK ∈
[
1
2 , 1
]
. A key technical property needed in their proof is that
KL
(
1
2v ,
9
10
1
2v +
1
10
1
2(v−ε)
) ≤ cε2 for some constant c independent of ε and for all v ≥ 3/4. A long
and tedious computation shows that such construction only works if K is large compared to T .
Lemma 7 For all K ≥ 1, for all ε ∈ (0, 12K ], and for all k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}, denoting v = 12 + kε,
KL
(
1
2v
∥∥∥ 9
10
1
2v
+
1
10
1
2(v − ε)
)
>
ε
800k
.
Even if the technique used by Kleinberg and Leighton (2003) fails in our setting, it is still possible
to prove the following lower bound by changing some key aspects of their analysis, which in turn
is based on the lower bound analysis of (Auer et al., 2002b). First, valuations need to be distanced
as much as possible —this is the exact opposite of their construction, where valuations were placed
ε-close to each others. Second, the base distribution is only perturbed by an appropriate small
constant. Third, the “good valuation” is drawn from a sensible proper subset of valuations. We now
restate and prove Theorem 1.
Theorem 1 For any number of valuations K ≥ 3 and all time horizons T ≥ K3 there exist K
pairs
(
v1, p(v1)
)
, . . . ,
(
vK , p(vK)
)
such that the expected regret of any pricing strategy satisfies
RT ≥ 1
375
√
KT .
Proof For notational convenience, fix K ≥ 2 and define the set {v0, . . . , vK} of K + 1 valuations
by
vi =
1
2
+
i
2K
, ∀i ∈ {0, . . . ,K} .
Define the distribution p0 on {v0, . . . , vK} of the random variable V0 by
P(V0 ≥ v) =
∑
i : vi≥v
p0(vi) =
1
2v
, ∀v ∈ {v0, . . . , vK} .
With this choice of demand curve, vP(V0 ≥ v) = 1/2, i.e., each valuation v has the same expected
revenue. Furthermore, the distribution v 7→ p0(v) satisfies the following: p0(v0) = 1K+1 ; p0
decreases monotonically on {v0, . . . , vK−1}, p0(vK−1) = 12K−1 , and p0(vK) = 1/2. Therefore
1
2K
≤ p0(v) ≤ 1
K
, ∀v ∈ {v0, . . . , vK−1} . (4)
Now, for each j ∈ {dK/2e, . . . ,K}, define the distribution pj by slightly lowering the probability
of vj−1 and upping the probability of vj by the same amount:
pj (vi) =

p0(vi), i ∈ {0, . . . ,K} \ {j − 1, j},
(1− 4Kε)p0(vj−1), i = j − 1,
p0(vj) + 4Kεp0(vj−1), i = j,
(5)
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where ε ∈ (0, 140) is a small constant determined below. Note that if the buyers’ valuations were
distributed as pj , all valuations v 6= vj would have expected revenue 12 , but vj whould have expected
revenue at least 12 +ε because of (4) and (5). In order to define the distribution of buyers’ valuations
V =
(
V1, . . . , VT
)
, let J be uniformly distributed over
{dK/2e, . . . ,K} (that is, the set of indices
i ∈ {1, . . . ,K} such that vi ≥ 34 ). The value of J will give the “good valuation”, that is the
valuation with the highest expected revenue. For all t, the distribution of Vt is determined by
P
(
Vt = vi | J = j
)
= pj(vi), ∀i ∈ {0, . . . ,K},∀j ∈
{dK/2e, . . . ,K} .
Denoting the seller’s randomized strategy by X = (X1, . . . , XT ) and applying Fubini’s theorem,
we obtain
RT = max
k∈{0,...,K}
EXEJ,V
[
T∑
t=1
rt(vk)−
T∑
t=1
rt(Xt)
]
.
According to the previous identity, we can (an will!) lower bound the internal expectation assuming
that the seller’s strategy is deterministic. Furthermore, assume that the seller’s pricing strategy only
offers prices in {vdK/2e, . . . , vK}—since it is counterproductive to offer a price outside of it as all
other valuations (v1, . . . , vdK/2e−1 in particular) have smaller expected revenues. Now let Ni be the
number of times the seller offer valuation vi,
Ni =
T∑
t=1
I{Xt = vi} .
By construction, each time the seller picks the “good valuation”, no regret is accrued; all other times
at least ε is lost. Therefore
EJ,V
[
T∑
t=1
rt(vk)−
T∑
t=1
rt(Xt)
]
≥ ε(T − EJ,V [NJ ]) . (6)
Denote by Yt the Bernoulli random variable I{V t ≥ Xt} which is 1 if and only if the t-th buyer
accepted the price offered, Y t = (Y1, . . . , Yt), and Y = Y T . Denote by q0 the distribution of Y if
buyer’s valuations were distributed as p0 and by qi the distribution of Y if buyer’s valuations were
distributed as pi. For any deterministic function f : {0, 1}T → [0,M ],
EV
[
f(Y ) | J = i]− E0[f(Y )] = ∑
bT∈{0,1}T
f(bT )
(
qi(b
T )− q0(bT )
)
≤
∑
bT∈{0,1}T
qi(b
T )>q0(bT )
f(bT )
(
qi(b
T )− q0(bT )
)
≤M
∑
bT∈{0,1}T
qi(b
T )>q0(bT )
(
qi(b
T )− q0(bT )
)
≤M
√
1
2
KL(q0 ‖ qi)
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where E0 is the expectation with respect to distribution p0 and in the last step we used Pinsker’s
inequality. Let qi(bt | bt−1) = pi (Yt = bt | Y1 = b1, . . . , Yt−1 = bt−1) and let q0(bt | bt−1) be
defined similarly. By the chain rule of the relative entropy
KL(q0 ‖ qi) =
T∑
t=1
q0(b
t−1)
∑
bt−1∈{0,1}t−1
KL
(
q0(bt | bt−1) ‖ qi(bt | bt−1)
)
=
T∑
t=1
q0(b
t−1)
∑
bt−1 : Xt(bt−1)6=vi
KL
(
q0(bt | bt−1) ‖ qi(bt | bt−1)
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
+
T∑
t=1
q0(b
t−1)
∑
bt−1 : Xt(bt−1)=vi
KL
(
q0(bt | bt−1) ‖ qi(bt | bt−1)
)
where the relative entropy is zero when Xt 6= vi because in that case pi(Yt = 1) = p0(Yt = 1). If
on the other hand, Xt = vi, for all vi ≥ 34 ,
KL
(
q0(bt | bt−1) ‖ qi(bt | bt−1)
)
= KL
(
1
2vi
∥∥∥ 1
2vi
+ 4Kεp0(vj−1)
)
≤ 108ε2
where the last inequality follows by (4) and KL
(
x ‖ x + α) ≤ α2(x+ α)−1(1− x− α)−1, with
x = 12vi ∈
[
1
2 ,
2
3
]
and α = 4Kεp0(vj−1) ∈ [2ε, 4ε]. Therefore
KL(q0 ‖ qi) ≤ 108ε2
T∑
t=1
q0(b
t−1)
∑
bt−1 : Xt(bt−1)=vi
1 = 108ε2
T∑
t=1
p0(Xt = vi) = 108ε
2E0[Ni] ,
where again, E0 is the expectation with respect to distribution p0. This gives
EV [f(Y ) | J = i] ≤ E0[f(Y )] + εM
√
54E0[Ni] .
Then, being for any deterministic online pricing strategy the random variable Ni a determinis-
tic function of Y , EV [Ni | J = i] ≤ E0[Ni] + εT
√
54E0[Ni]. Thus, using Jensen inequality,
EJ,V [Ni] ≤ EJE0[NJ ] + εT
√
54EJE0[NJ ]. Using again Jensen inequality, Fubini’s Theorem, and
inequality (6),
EJ,V EX
[
T∑
t=1
rt(vk)−
T∑
t=1
rt(Xt)
]
≥ ε
(
T − EJE0EX [NJ ]− εT
√
54EJE0EX [NJ ]
)
.
Since
∑K
i=dK/2eNi = T , we also have
∑K
i=dK/2e E0EX [Ni] = T . Using the fact thatK−dK/2e+
1 ≥ max{3/2,K/2}, this implies
EJE0EX [NJ ] =
1
K − dK/2e+ 1
K∑
i=dK/2e
E0EX [Ni] ≤ min
{
2
3
,
2
K
}
T .
Putting everything together, we get
RT ≥ ε
(
T − 2
3
T − εT
√
108T
K
)
= εT
(
1
3
− ε
√
108T
K
)
,
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which picking ε = 1
6
√
108
√
K/T so that ε
√
108T/K = 1/6, gives
RT ≥ 1
375
√
KT
as desired.
We now move on to proving Theorem 2, that we restate below.
Theorem 2 If for some constant c? > 0 a seller algorithm has regret smaller than c?
√
T on any
instance of the stochastic dynamic pricing problem with at most three valuations, then there exists
an instance with ∆ = Θ(1) on which the algorithm suffers regret Ω(
√
T ).
Proof We consider two instances. The first has ∆ = 14 and the second has ∆ = O(1/
√
T ). We
prove that if the algorithm has regret O(√T ) on both instances, then it must have regret Ω(√T ) on
the first instance. The two instances are defined as follows.
Instance 1
v
(1)
1 = 0 D
(1)(0) = 1 r(1)(0) = 0
v
(1)
2 =
1
2 D
(1)
(
1
2
)
= 12 r
(1)
(
1
2
)
= 14
Instance 2
v
(2)
1 = 0 D
(2)(0) = 1 r(2)(0) = 0
v
(2)
2 =
1−η
2 D
(2)
(1−η
2
)
= 12 + η r
(2)
(1−η
2
)
= 1+η−2η
2
4
v
(2)
3 =
1
2 D
(2)
(
1
2
)
= 12 r
(2)
(
1
2
)
= 14
In Instance 1 the optimal price is v(1)2 =
1
2 with revenue
1
4 . In Instance 2 the optimal price is
v
(2)
2 =
1−η
2 with revenue
1+η−2η2
4 ≥ 14 + η8 for η ≤ 14 . Without loss of generality, we can assume that
the seller algorithm only posts prices in the set
{
0, 1−η2 ,
1
2
}
. Let Nη(t) be the number of times that
the price 1−η2 is posted and let ν
(i)
t be the law of observed rewards up to time t in Instance i ∈ {1, 2}.
Since prices 0 and 12 are uninformative (because demand and revenue do no change across the two
instances), it follows from standard calculations that the KL divergence between ν(1)t and ν
(2)
t is
upper bounded by the KL between two Bernoulli of parameter 12 and
1
2 + η times the expected
number of times v2 is chosen under Instance 1,
KL
(
ν
(1)
t ‖ ν(2)t
) ≤ KL(1
2
∥∥∥ 1
2
+ η
)
E1
[
Nη(t)
] ≤ 4η2 E1[Nη(t)] if η ≤ 1
4
where E1 denotes expectation under Instance 1. Let R
(i)
T be the regret under Instance i ∈ {1, 2}.
Since r(1)
(1−η
2
)
= 1−η2 D
(1)
(1−η
2
)
= 1−η4 , we have R
(1)
T ≥ η4E1
[
Nη(T )
]
. Using the assumption
that the seller’s algorithm has a regret smaller than c?
√
T , and adapting an argument of Bubeck
et al. (2013, Proof of Theorem 5), we can write
η
4
T
4
exp
(
− 4η2E1
[
Nη(T )
]) ≤ max{R(1)T , R(2)T } ≤ c?√T .
Hence, for η = 32c
?√
T
, it must hold that E1
[
Nη(t)
] ≥ ln 2
4η2
, which implies that R(1)T ≥ ln 2512c?
√
T .
Theorem 2 can be extended to the case when K is known to the seller. This can be done by adding
an extra valuation v(1)3 > v
(1)
2 to Instance 1 which has either vanishing probability p3 or vanishing
distance v(1)3 − v(1)2 from v(1)2 . (In the latter case the value of v(1)3 depends on the algorithms.) In
both cases the seller algorithm is unlikely to detect the presence of this extra valuation, and a slight
modified proof of Theorem 2 can be applied.
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Algorithm 3: Cautious search
Input: Time horizon T ∈ N.
Initialization: set a← 0, b← 1, n← 1, ε← 1/2.
1 for t ∈ {1, . . . T} do
2 post Xt = a+ nε and get feedback Zt = I {Xt ≤ v};
3 if Zt = 1 then // undershooting
4 if Xt + ε < b then update n← n+ 1;
5 else update a← Xt, n← 1, ε← ε2; // shrink the interval
6 else if Zt = 0 then // overshooting
7 update a← Xt − ε, b← Xt, n← 1, ε← ε2; // shrink the interval
8 end
Appendix B. Cautious search
Kleinberg and Leighton (2003) were first to introduce a “cautious search” as an optimal algorithm
for posted price with a single unknown evaluation. Similarly, our cautious search (Algorithm 3)
proceeds in phases s ∈ {1, 2, . . .} in which an interval [as, bs] (initialized to [0, 1]) and a step size
εs (initialized to 1/2) are maintained. In a given phase s of the algorithm, prices as + εs, as +
2εs, as + 3εs, . . . are posted until one of them, say Xs, becomes bigger than the hidden evaluation
(overshooting). At this point a new phase begins: the interval becomes [as+1, bs+1] = [Xs −
εs, Xs], and the new step size becomes εs+1 = ε2s. This process continues until the length of the
interval is less than 1/T . Then the left endpoint of the interval is picked for all remaining rounds. We
now state two lemmas about the behavior of cautious search. The first one is proven in (Kleinberg
and Leighton, 2003, Theorem 2.1).
Lemma 8 The regret of Algorithm 3 satisfies E
[∑T
t=1 rt(v)−
∑T
t=1 rt(Xt)
]
≤ 3 ln ln(T ) + 8.
Moreover, the number of overshootings is upper bounded by log log T .
The second lemma bounds the size of the interval as a function of the number of steps.
Lemma 9 For all m, the size of an interval [as, bs] after m steps of Algorithm 3 satisfies
bs − as ≤ 2
m
.
Proof The worst case happens when the sequence (b1−a1, b2−a2, . . .) of interval endpoints takes
values (
1, 1,
1
2
,
1
2
,
1
4
,
1
4
,
1
4
,
1
4
, . . . ,
1
22n
, . . . ,
1
22n
, . . .
)
(7)
where the general term 1/22
n
is repeated 22
n
times. It is then sufficient to show that the inequality
holds for all values before a switch. Formally, that for all n ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .}
1
22n
≤ 2
2 +
∑n
j=0 2
2j
or, equivalently, 2 +
n∑
j=0
22
j ≤ 2 · 22n .
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We prove this by induction on n. The case n = 0 is trivial. If the inequality holds for n ∈ {0, 1, . . .},
then
2 +
n+1∑
j=0
22
j
= 2 +
n∑
j=0
22
j
+ 22
n+1 ≤ 2 · 22n + 22n+1 = 22n (2 + 22n) ≤ 2 · 22n+1 .
This concludes the proof.
The previous bound is unimprovable. Indeed in scenario (7), for all n ∈ {0, 1, . . .}
22
n
< 2 +
n∑
j=0
22
j ≤ 2 · 22n
and the second inequality is actually an equality for n = 0.
Appendix C. UCB with inflated confidence bounds
In this section we prove a regret bound for UCB1 run with an oracle that systematically inflates the
upper confidence bounds for suboptimal arms.
Lemma 10 Consider a stochastic bandit problem with K arms, i.i.d. rewards Xt(k) ∈ [0, 1] from
each arm k, and average rewards µ1, . . . , µK . Let ∆k = µ? − µk where µ? = µi? and i? is the
index of an optimal arm. Consider a UCB policy that at round t selects arm It defined by
It = arg max
k∈{1,...,K}
(
X̂t(k) + c
(
Nt(k), k
))
(ties broken arbitrarily), where X̂t is the sample average of the rewards obtained from arm k over
the Nt(k) times when the arm was chosen in rounds 1, . . . , t− 1 (initially, N1(k) = 0 for all arms)
and
c(s, k) =

α ln(δ−1)
γ2s
+
√
ln(δ−1)
s
if k is suboptimal,√
ln(δ−1)
s
otherwise,
with α ≥ 0 and c(s, k) = +∞ if s = 0. Then
RT ≤ 1 +
(
2(δT )2 +
8α ln(δ−1)
γ2
)
K +
∑
k : ∆k>0
4 ln(δ−1)
∆k
.
Proof Pick any suboptimal arm k and t ≥ 2. Note that It = k implies
X̂t(i
?) + c
(
Nt(i
?), i?
) ≤ X̂t(k) + c(Nt(k), k)
which in turn imply(
X̂t(i
?) ≤ µ∗ − c(Nt(i?), i?)) ∨ (X̂t(k) ≥ µk + c(Nt(k), k)) ∨ (c(Nt(k), k) > ∆k/2) .
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Using standard Chernoff bounds, we can write
T∑
t=2
P
(
X̂t(i
?) ≤ µ∗ − c(Nt(i?), i?)) ≤ T∑
t=2
P
(
∃s ∈ {1, . . . , t− 1}, X̂t(i?) ≤ µ∗ − c(s, i?)
)
≤
T∑
t=2
t−1∑
s=1
exp
(
−2s ln(δ
−1)
s
)
≤ T 2δ2
and
T∑
t=2
P
(
X̂t(k) ≥ µk + c
(
Nt(k), k
)) ≤ T∑
t=2
P
(
∃s ∈ {1, . . . , t− 1}, X̂t(k) ≥ µk + c(s, k)
)
≤
T∑
t=2
P
(
∃s ∈ {1, . . . , t− 1}, X̂t(k) ≥ µk +
√
2 ln(δ−1)
s
)
≤
T∑
t=2
t−1∑
s=1
exp
(
−2s ln(δ
−1)
s
)
≤ T 2δ2 .
It remains to control I
{
c
(
Nt(k), k
)
> ∆k/2
}
when It = k. We now show that
T∑
t=2
I
{
c
(
Nt(k), k
)
> ∆k/2
} ≤ 4( 2α
γ2∆k
+
1
∆2k
)
ln(δ−1) .
If k is chosen s > 0 times in the first t− 1 steps, then Nt(k) = s. Thus c(s, k) > ∆k/2 implies
α ln(δ−1)
γ2s
+
√
ln(δ−1)
s
>
∆k
2
. (8)
We now prove that s must be smaller than
4
(
2α
γ2∆k
+
1
∆2k
)
ln(δ−1)
for this to happen. If α = 0 this is trivially true. To see that this still true for α > 0, note that with
this assumption (8) is equivalent to√
ln(δ−1)
s
>
−1 +√1 + 2∆kα/γ2
2α/γ2
.
Setting x = 2∆kα/γ2 > 0, solving for s, and using x√1+x−1 ≤ 2
√
1 + x proves the claim. Picking
δ = T , the regret is therefore bounded as follows
RT ≤ 1 +
∑
k : ∆k>0
∆k
T∑
t=2
P(It = k) ≤ 1 + 2KT 2δ2 + 8αK
γ2
ln(δ−1) +
∑
k : ∆k>0
4 ln(δ−1)
∆k
.
This concludes the proof.
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Algorithm 4: Noisy Cautious Search
Input: confidence parameter δ ∈ (0, 1), valuation index i ∈ {1, 2}, lower bound γi ∈ (0, 1).
Initialization: set a← 0, b← 1.
1 for s ∈ {0, 1, . . . , dlog2 log2 T e} do // phases
2 set n← 1, εs ← 2−2s , D ← 1;
3 while (a+ nεs < b) ∧
[
(i = 1 ∧D = 1) ∨ (i = 2 ∧D > 0)] do
4 offer price a+ nεs for
⌈
ln(δ)/ln(1− γi)
⌉
rounds; // a macrostep
5 update n← n+ 1 and the sample mean D of D(a+ (n− 1)εs);
6 end
7 update a← a+ (n− 1)εs, b← a+ nεs;
8 end
9 offer a for all remaining rounds;
Appendix D. Two valuations
In this section we present all key results related to subroutines of Algorithm 7 and give a formal
proof of Theorem 6.
Noisy Cautious Search
This procedure is a variant of the cautious search described in Appendix B. It identifies the location
of a valuation vi with high probability and low regret whenever a lower bound γi on its probability
pi is known in advance. During the search, each price is posted for
⌈
ln(δ)/ln(1− γi)
⌉
times in a
row, where δ is a confidence parameter. We call such a sequence of consecutive rounds a macrostep.
For i = 1, we say that a macrostep is a failure if at least one price is rejected, it is a success if all
prices are accepted, and the algorithm makes a mistake if the macrostep is a success but the price
offered is strictly bigger than v1. For i = 2, we say that a macrostep is a failure if no price is
accepted, it is a success if at least one price is accepted, and the algorithm makes a mistake if the
macrostep is a failure but the price offered is at most v2.
The Noisy Cautious Search for a valuation vi proceeds in phases and begins by offering 1/2
during the first macrostep. During each phase n ≥ 0, if the last macrostep was a success, the
price offered is increased by 2−2n . As soon as a macrostep is a failure, phase n ends and phase
n+1 begins by offering the price of the last successful macrostep, plus 2−2n+1 . After dlog2 log2 T e
phases, the price of the last successful macrostep is offered for all remaining rounds.
Lemma 11 The Noisy Cautious Search for vi with parameters i, δ, γi satisfies the following:
1. the price offered during each macrostepm is 2/m-close to vi with probability at least 1−mδ;
2. the total reward accumulated by the end of macrostep m is at least(
mviD(vi)− 3(ln lnT )− 8
) ln δ
ln(1− γi)
with probability at least 1−mδ.
Proof Claim 1 follows by Lemma 9 and the fact that the probability of making a mistake during each
macrostep is at most δ by Chernoff inequality for Bernoulli random variables. Similarly, claim 2
follows by Lemma 8 and, again, Chernoff inequality.
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Capped Mean Estimation
We begin this section by providing a method to find a high-confidence multiplicative estimate of
the expectation µ of any [0, 1]-valued random variable, using only O( ln(1/δ)/µ) samples. Most
notably, the expectation µ need not be known in advance. With our novel technique, we improve
upon Berthet and Perchet (2017, Lemma 13), that proved a similar risult using O( ln(1/δ)/µ2)
samples. This result will be pivotal for our analysis and we believe it will also be valuable in its
own right. For any set X1, . . . , XT of random variables, we denote by
Xt =
1
t
t∑
s=1
Xs and S2t =
1
t− 1
t∑
s=1
(
Xs −Xt
)2
the sample mean and the sample variance of the first t random variables. The following result
is a straightforward consequence of the empirical Bernstein bound and the confidence bound for
standard deviation proven in (Maurer and Pontil, 2009, Theorems 4, 10).
Theorem 12 Let X1, . . . , XT be a set of [0, 1]-valued i.i.d. random variables with expectation µ
and standard deviation σ. For all δ ∈ (0, 1) and all t ∈ {2, . . . , T}, the two following conditions
hold simultaneously with probability at least 1− 3δ
∣∣Xt − µ∣∣ ≤ √2St( ln(1/δ)
t
)1/2
+
7
3
ln(1/δ)
t− 1 and St ≤ σ +
√
2
(
ln(1/δ)
t− 1
)1/2
.
We can now prove our multiplicative mean estimation theorem.
Theorem 13 (Multiplicative mean estimation) LetX1, . . . , XT be a set of [0, 1]-valued i.i.d. ran-
dom variables with expectation µ > 0 and standard deviation σ. For all δ ∈ (0, 1) and all α ≥ 0,
if T ≥ t0, where
t0 =
⌈
α+ 2
3µ
ln
(
1
δ
)(√
9α2 + 114α+ 192 + 3α+ 19
)⌉
+ 2 = O
(
α2
µ
ln
1
δ
)
and τ = τ(T, δ, α) is the smallest time t ∈ {2, . . . , T} such that
Xt
α+ 1
≥
√
2St
(
ln(1/δ)
t
)1/2
+
7
3
ln(1/δ)
t− 1 (9)
then, with probability at least 1− 3(T − 1)δ,
1. τ ≤ t0,
2. for all t ∈ {2, . . . , T} such that (9) holds,(
α
α+ 1
)
Xt < µ <
(
α+ 2
α+ 1
)
Xt . (10)
Proof Denote for all t ∈ {2, . . . , T}, ct =
√
2S2t ln(1/δ)/t + (7/3) ln(1/δ)/(t − 1). By Theo-
rem 12, the good event
G =
{
∀t ∈ {2, . . . , T}, Xt − ct < µ < Xt + ct and St ≤ σ +
√
2 ln(1/δ)/(t− 1)
}
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Algorithm 5: Capped Mean Estimation
Input: x1, x2, . . . ∈ [0, 1], θ ∈ [0, 1], δ ∈ (0, 1), ρ ∈ {0, 1}.
Initialization: set t← 3 and D̂s = (1− ρ)I {Vs ≥ xs}+ ρ(1− I {Vs ≥ xs}) for all s.
1 offer x1 and x2 once each;
2 set D ← 12
∑2
s=1 D̂s and S
2 ←∑2s=1 (D̂s −D)2;
3 while
[
t ≤ d40 ln(1/δ)/θe+ 2] ∧ [D <√8S2 ln(1/δ)/t+ (14/3) ln(1/δ)/(t− 1)] do
4 offer price xt once;
5 update D ← (D(t− 1) + D̂t)/t, S2 ← (S2(t− 2) + (D̂t −D)2)/(t− 1), and t← t+ 1;
6 end
7 if t > d40 ln(1/δ)/θe+ 2 then return that µ ≤ θ;
8 else return D/2;
has probability P(G) ≥ 1− 3(T − 1)δ. For all outcomes in G and all t ∈ {2, . . . , T},
Xt < (α+ 1)ct ⇐⇒ µ− ct < Xt < (α+ 1)ct =⇒ µ < (α+ 2)ct =⇒ t < t0
hence τ ≤ t0. This implies that for all outcomes in G and all t ∈ {1, . . . , T} such that Xt ≥
(α+ 1)ct,(
α
α+ 1
)
Xt = Xt − Xt
α+ 1
≤ Xt − ct < µ < Xt + ct ≤ Xt + Xt
α+ 1
=
(
α+ 2
α+ 1
)
Xt.
The following capped version of the previous theorem interrupts the process if during the multi-
plicative mean estimation it is learned that µ is smaller than some threshold parameter θ.
Corollary 1 (Capped Mean Estimation) For any threshold parameter θ ∈ [0, 1], under the same
assumptions of Theorem 13, define τθ = min{τ, tθ}, where
tθ =
⌈
α+ 2
3θ
ln
(
1
δ
)(√
9α2 + 114α+ 192 + 3α+ 19
)⌉
+ 2 = O
(
α2
θ
ln
1
δ
)
.
With probability at least 1− 3(T − 1)δ,
1. if τθ = τ , then for all t ∈ {2, . . . , T} such that (9) holds, inequalities (10) also hold;
2. if τθ = tθ, then µ ≤ θ.
Our Capped Mean Estimation is defined as the Capped Mean Estimation of the demand curve (or
one minus the demand curve if ρ = 1) at a given sequence of prices3 x1, x2, . . ., with threshold
θ ∈ [0, 1] (where 1/θ is interpreted as ∞ when θ = 0), confidence parameter δ ∈ (0, 1), reverse
parameter ρ (that regulates if D(x1) or 1−D(x1) is being estimated) and α = 1 (Algorithm 5).
3. This algorithm is only used for prices x1, x2, . . . such such that D(xs) = D(xt) for all s, t.
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VARIANT: JOINT CAPPED MEAN ESTIMATION
We call (w, θ, δ)-Joint Capped Mean Estimation a variant of Algorithm 5 in which xt = w for
all t and estimations for both ρ = 0 and ρ = 1 are carried on at the same time; i.e., where both D
(sample mean for ρ = 0) andD′ = 1−D (sample mean for ρ = 1), as well as their respective sample
variances S2 and (S′)2 are maintained; the condition
[
D ≤√8S2 ln(1/δ)/t+(14/3) ln(1/δ)/(t−
1)
]
in the while loop is replaced by
(
A ∨A′) = ([D <√8S2
t
ln
1
δ
+
14
3(t− 1) ln
1
δ
]
∨
[
D
′
<
√
8(S′)2
t
ln
1
δ
+
14
3(t− 1) ln
1
δ
])
and at the end, we returnD/2 (resp.,D′/2) and we say thatD(w) (resp., 1−D(w)) is well-estimated
if and only if A (resp., A′) is false; if A (resp., A′) is true we return that D(w) (resp., 1−D(w)) is
at most θ.
VARIANT: CAPPED MEAN ESTIMATION ON NOISY CAUTIOUS SEARCH
With a slight abuse of notation, we say that a (θ, δ, ρ)-Capped Mean Estimation is run on a (δ, i, γi)-
Noisy Cautious Search if x1, x2, . . . are the prices offered during the first successful macrosteps of
a (δ, i, γi)-Noisy Cautious Search run for Θ
(
1
D(x1)
)
macrosteps (resp., Θ
(
1
1−D(x1)
)
macrosteps);
i.e., while the Noisy Cautious Search proceeds, an increasingly accurate estimate p̂ of D(x1) (resp.,
1 − D(x1)) is maintained at the same time using samples from successful macrosteps; as soon as
the stopping criterion for the Capped Mean Estimation is met, the estimation stops while the Noisy
Cautious Search proceeds until it reaches d6/p̂e macrosteps, at which point the whole process ends
returning p̂ and the price v̂i offered during the last succesful Noisy Cautious Search macrostep.
Cautious Mean Estimation
The main idea of this section is that the problem for K = 2 is completely solved by determining v1,
v2, and p2. This suggests that computing an high-confidence estimate p2 once a value w ∈ (v1, v2]
is located might be a good idea. Sadly, it is not. The problem with this approach is that if p2 is very
small an arbitrary high regret may be incurred in doing so. On the other hand, the more evidence is
gathered that p2 is very small, the less likely it is that v2 is optimal. For these and other more subtle
reasons, a great deal of caution is needed in order to obtain estimate of p2 that is just good enough
to use.
The algorithm we present for dealing with these issues is called Cautious Mean Estimation and
it receives as an input a price w ∈ (v1, v2] (i.e., that can be used to estimate p2), as well as a
confidence parameter δ. The routine begins by determining if p1 and p2 are both bigger than 1/4
by using a Joint Capped Mean Estimation and invoking Corollary 1. If this is true, it simply returns
the estimates of p1 and p2 to the main routine; otherwise it behaves differently depending on which
one is true: p2 ≤ 1/4 or p2 ≥ 3/4, which can be checked invoking again Corollary 1. If p2 ≤ 1/4,
it proceeds in phases. In each phase s, it checks if v1 ≥ 2−s by offering 2−s a small number of
times, in which case it halts returning that v1 is the optimum. If it is not, it determines if p1 and p2
are bigger than 2−(k+1) by using one more time Corollary 1, in which case it returns their estimates
to the main routine. If they are not, it moves on to phase k + 1. If on the other hand p2 was bigger
than 3/4, it performs a Noisy Cautious Search for v2, while at the same time collecting samples to
estimate p1, returning estimates v̂2 and p̂1. Then it first checks if v1 ≤ v̂2(1 − p̂1) − p̂1 by posting
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Algorithm 6: Cautious Mean Estimation
Input: price w ∈ [0, 1], confidence parameter δ ∈ (0, 1).
1 run a (w, 2−2, δ)-Joint Capped Mean Estimation, returning p̂1, p̂2;
2 if D(w) and 1−D(w) are both well-estimated then // 1/4 ≤ p1, p2 ≤ 3/4
3 return p̂1, p̂2;
4 else if 1−D(w) is well-estimated then // p1 > 3/4
5 for s ∈ {2, 3, . . .} do
6 offer 2−s for
⌈
ln(δ)/ ln(3/4)
⌉
rounds;
7 if all offers are accepted then break and return that v1 is optimal;
8 else
9 continue the Joint Capped Mean Estimation with new parameters w, 2−(s+1), δ;
10 if p1 and p2 are both well-estimated then break and return p̂1, p̂2;
11 end
12 else if D(w) is well-estimated then // p2 > 3/4
13 run (0, δ, 1)-Capped Mean Estimation on
(
δ, 2, 34
)
-Noisy Cautious Search, returning p̂1, v̂2;
14 offer v̂2q̂2 − p̂1 for
⌈
ln(1/δ)/p̂1
⌉
rounds, where q̂2 ← 1− p̂1;
15 if at least one offer is rejected then return that v2 is optimal;
16 else return p̂1, p̂2;
the latter for
⌈
ln(1/δ)/p̂1
⌉
rounds. If the test is positive, it halts returning that v2 is the optimum.
Otherwise it returns p̂1 and p̂2 to the main routine.
Lemma 14 For all w ∈ (v1, v2] and all δ ∈ (0, 1), the Cautious Mean Estimation run with
parameters w, δ satisfies the following with probability at least 1− (15T − 13)δ:
1. if the algorithm returns that v1 or v2 is optimal, then it is correct;
2. if the algorithm returns p̂1 and p̂2, then both satisfy pi/3 < p̂i < pi;
3. the regret of the algorithm it at most (13)2 ln(1/δ) + 6.
Proof By definition of Joint Capped Mean Estimation, line 6 lasts for at most
⌈
160 ln(1/δ)
⌉
+ 2
rounds, which upper bounds the regret accrued during those time steps. Denote G the good event in
which which items 1 and 2 of Corollary 1 hold simultaneously for both the estimate of p1 and p2. To
prove the result, we can (and do!) restrict our analysis to good outcomes, i.e., outcomes belonging
in G. Indeed, Corollary 1 implies that one and only one of the three conditions at lines 2, 4, and 12
is executed with probability at least P(G) ≥ 1 − 6(T − 1)δ and we will show that the result holds
in all three cases.
If the condition at line 2 is true, then the result follows immediately by Corollary 1.
Assume now that the condition at line 4 is true and fix k ∈ N such that 2−k ≤ max{v1, p2} ≤
2−(k−1). Note that if v1 ≥ p2, the loop at line 5 will break with probability at least 1−δ (by Chernoff
inequality) at line 7 as soon as s = k; this proves point 1 for v1. If on the other hand v1 < p2, the
loop will break with probability at least 1 − 6(T − 1)δ (by Corollary 1) at line 10 as soon as
s = k−1; this proves point 2. In any case, then, at most k−1 cycles of the loop are performed with
probability at least 1 − (6T − 5)δ. If s ≤ k, line 6 is performed at most k − 1 times and since the
cost of sampling is at most v1 (if v1 is optimal) or p2 (if v2 is optimal), than the total regret accrued
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by executing line 6 is at most (k− 1)⌈ ln(δ)/ ln(3/4)⌉max{v1, p2} ≤ (e ln 2)−1⌈ ln(δ)/ ln(3/4)⌉,
where we used x log2(1/x) ≤ (e ln 2)−1, for all x > 0. On the other hand, by the end of phase
k the Joint Capped Mean Estimation at lines 6, 9 has offered w for at most
⌈
2k+140 ln(1/δ)
⌉
+ 2
accruing at most 40 ln(1/δ) + 3 regret. This proves point 3.
Finally, consider the case in which the condition at line 12 is true. The Noisy Cautious Search
at line 13 stops after at most
⌈
40 ln(1/δ)/p1
⌉
+2 rounds, returning p̂i ∈ (pi/3, pi), with probability
at least 1− (7T −6)δ by the fact that it makes a mistake with probability at most δ and Theorem 13.
This proves point 2. If v2 is optimal, Lemma 11 shows that the regret of the Noisy Cautious Search
is at most
(
3(ln lnT ) + 8 ln(1/δ)
)
ln(4/3) with probability at least 1 − Tδ. If v1 is optimal, the
additional regret is at most
(d40 ln(1/δ)/p1e+ 2)(v1 − wp2) ≤ 40 ln(1/δ) + 3.
Consider now lines 14-15. Since p1/3 < p̂1 < p1, then p2 < q̂2 < p2 + (2/3)p1. Furthermore,
v2 − p1 ≤ v̂2 ≤ v2 with probability at least 1− Tδ by Lemma 11. If the test at line 15 is true, then
v1 < v2p2 and v2 is optimal with probability at least 1−δ; this proves point 1 for v2. To compute the
regret accumulated at line 14, assume first that v1 is optimal; then necessarily v1 ≥ v̂2q̂2 − p̂1 and
the regret of line 14 is at most (v1− v̂2q̂2 + p̂1)
⌈
3 ln(1/δ)/p1
⌉ ≤ 9 ln(1/δ)+3. If on the other hand
v2 is optimal, then the regret of line 14 is at most (p2v2− v̂2q̂2 + p̂1)
⌈
3 ln(1/δ)/p1
⌉ ≤ 6 ln(1/δ)+2.
This proves point 3 and concludes the proof.
2-UCB
This subroutine is a slightly modified version of Algorithm 2. The only differences are that two
feasible intervals are initialized at the beginning, each valuation vi gets a personalized number of
rounds
⌈
8 ln(δ)/ ln(1− γi)
⌉
at line 6, and the test at line 11 need not be executed as it is known in
advance that K = 2.
The following result is a straightforward adaptation of Theorem 4. As such, the proof is omitted.
Lemma 15 If ∆ = |p2v2− v1|, γ1 ≤ p1, γ2 ≤ p2, and 2-UCB run with δ = T−2, it incurs a regret
O
(
lnT
∆
+ (lnT )(ln lnT )
(
α1
− ln(1− γ1) +
α2
− ln(1− γ2)
))
,
where (α1, α2) = (v1 − v1p2, v1) if v1 is optimal, (α1, α2) = (v2p2 − v1p2, p2v2) if v2 is optimal,
and the first term is absent if ∆ = 0.
Proof of Theorem 6
We finally have all the instruments to prove Theorem 6, that we restate for completeness.
Theorem 6 If Algorithm 7 is run on two unknown pairs (v1, p1) and (v2, p2) with input parameter
δ = T−2, then its regret satisfies
RT = O
(
log T
∆
+ (log T )(log log T )
)
,
where the first term is absent if ∆ = |p2v2 − v1| is zero.
Proof Putting together the proofs of all previous lemmas, the probability of making a mistake in at
least a test of at least a routine is upper bounded by O(Tδ). For this reason, we can (an do) assume
that no mistakes happen. We divide the proof into three different cases.
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Algorithm 7:
Input: Confidence parameter δ ∈ (0, 1).
1 run a Binary Search, returning [a1, a2]; // phase 1
2 run a Capped Mean Estimation of the demand at a2 with parameter θ = a1, returning p˜2;
3 if p˜2 > 0 then set w ← a2 ;
4 else
5 offer price a1 until it is rejected; // check if a1 < v1 ≤ v2 < a2
6 set w ← a1;
7 run a Cautious Mean Estimation of the demand at w, returning p̂1 and p̂2; // phase 2
8 if the Cautious Mean Estimation was halted because v1 or v2 is the obvious optimum then
9 run a Cautious Search for the optimal valuation with lower bound 1/2;
10 else run 2-UCB with parameters γ1 = p̂1 and γ2 = p̂2 ; // shrink the interval
Case 1 Assume that during phase 1 all offers of a2 are rejected and all offers of a1 are accepted.
Consider the following four subcases. If a1 ≤ v1 ≤ v2 ≤ a2, the regret is at most O(log T ).
Assume now that v1 ≤ a1 ≤ v2 ≤ a2. If v2 is optimal, then the regret is at most O
(
log(T )/a1
)
=
O( log(T )/∆). If v1 is optimal, then the regret is at most O((v1 − a1p2)T + v1 ln(T )/a1) =
O(a1p1T + ln(T )). Note that this case only happens with probability pO(T−ln(T )/a1)2 , which is at
least 1/T only if p1 = O
( log T
T−log(T )/a1
)
. Now, if a1 = Ω
(
log(T )/T
)
then the regret is at most
O(log T ); otherwise it is at most O(log T ) because v1 is small. If a1 ≤ v1 ≤ a2 ≤ v2, the regret
is at most O((max{v1, p2v2} − a1)T + max{v1, p2v2} log(T )/a1). Since all offers of a2 were
rejected, Corollary 1 implies that p2 ≤ a1, then p2v2 ≤ a1 ≤ v1, hence v1 is optimal. The regret
is therefore at most O(log T ). Finally, assume that v1 ≤ a1 ≤ a2 ≤ v2. Combining the same
arguments as above, v1 is optimal but p1 is small and the total regret is at most O(log T ).
Case 2 Assume that during phase 1 some offers of a2 are accepted. Corollary 1 implies that
the first Capped Mean Estimation lasts at most O( log(T )/max{a1, p2}) rounds, hence its re-
grets is at most O(log T ). Lemma 14 implies that the Cautious Mean Estimation has a regret at
most O(log T ). If the cautious mean estimation is halted returning that v1 or v2 is optimal, then
Lemma 11 implies that the regret is at most O((log T )(log log T )). Assume now that the cautious
mean estimation returns p̂1, p̂2. By construction, if p2 ≤ 1/4, then necessarily v1 ≤ 2p2, thus
∆ ≤ 2p2. On the other end, if p2 ≥ 3/4, then necessarily v1 ≥ p2v2 − 2p1 thus ∆ ≤ 2p1 if v2 is
optimal. Using Lemma 15 and plugging in the above upper bounds gives the result.
Case 3 Assume that during phase 1 all offers of a2 are rejected and some offers of a1 are re-
jected. The proof of this case is the same as the previous one, except that sampling a2 has an extra
regret cost. If v1 is optimal, then the additional regret is at most O
(
v1 log(T )/a1
)
= O(lnT )
because v1 < a1. Finally, assume that v2 is optimal. If v2 ≤ a2, the additional cost is at most(
ln(T )/a1
)
p2v2 = O(lnT ). If a2 < v2, then p2 ≤ a1 by Corollary 1 and the additional cost is at
most O((p2v2 − p2a2) log(T )/a1) = O(log T ).
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